Palestrante: Luiz Ricardo Kabbach de Castro (Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez – Business School – Campus Peñalolén)
We investigate the rationale behind ownership concentration across emerging markets. Agency theory proposes that the ownership concentration is a mechanism to reduce agency costs, while institutional theory suggests that the ownership concentration is a by-product of weak institutions that do not promote investor protection. We develop a multi-dimensional framework, which combines both theories to account for the effect of the largest shareholder’s characteristics and country’s institutional conditions on ownership concentration heterogeneity. Using new reliable data from seven Latin American countries, we construct a unique sample of 4,952 firm-year observations to test our conceptual framework. Our results show that not only host country institutions matter for ownership concentration but also the country of origin of the largest shareholder and its characteristics will also influence ownership patterns within and across countries. Our findings are robust to different specifications. This article illustrates how corporate governance practices get diffused across countries and reconfigured by host countries, and has important implications. At the conceptual level, we extend the view of ownership concentration beyond agency theory to explore the role of institutions. At the policy level, we identify one governance channel through which policy changes may improve economic welfare.
Data: 09 de abril de 2013 (terça-feira)
Local: Campus Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa
Rua Quatá, 300 – Vila Olímpia
Sala 203 – 2º andar