Palestrante: Seth Colby (The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies)
The state-owned Brazilian development bank (BNDES) has played a key role in the economic modernization of the country’s economy since its formation in 1952 and continues to do so 60 years later. The academic literature frequently cites the BNDES as a state agency that possesses levels of organizational capacity that surpasses other public entities in Brazil. This paper assesses the veracity of this claim, evaluating the entity’s performance in terms of its function as bank, a development bank, and an implementing agency. The study finds that Brazil’s development bank does perform its tasks more efficiently than similar organizations found in the private and public sector. The paper draws on principal-agent theory and identifies the institutional mechanisms that explain the organizational abilities of the BNDES. It finds that the bank uses a hybrid governance structure that employs many of the incentives found in private sector organizations in a public context.
Data: 28 de março de 2013 (quinta-feira)
Local: Campus Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa
Rua Quatá, 300 – Vila Olímpia
Sala 203 – 2º andar